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This paper investigates how the distribution of land property rights aﬀects industrial
take-oﬀ and aggregate income through the demand side. We study a stylized two
sectors economy where the manufacturing sector is assumed to be constituted by a
continuum of small markets producing distinct commodities. Following Murphy et
al. [24] we model industrialization as the introduction of an increasing returns tech-
nology in place of a constant returns one. However, we depart from their framework
by assuming income to be distributed according to functional groups’ membership
(landowners, capitalists, workers). We carry out an equilibrium analysis for diﬀerent
levels of land ownership concentration proving that, under the speciﬁed conditions,
there is a non-monotonic relation between the distribution of land property rights and
both industrialization and income. We clarify that non-monotonicity arises because
of the way land ownership concentration aﬀects the level and the distribution of prof-
its among capitalists. Our results suggest that i) both a too concentrated and a too
diﬀused distribution of land property rights can be detrimental to industrialization,
ii) landownership aﬀects the economic performance of an industrializing country by
determining industrial proﬁts and iii) in terms of optimal land distribution there may
be a tradeoﬀ between income and industrialization.1. Introduction
1. An Interesting Case: South Korea and Philippines in ’60-’80
Some years ago Lucas [23] raised an intriguing issue about the diﬀerent economic performances of
South Korea and Philippines.1 In the early 1960’s the two countries were similar under many respects
showing about the same GDP per capita, schooling levels, population and urbanization. Philippines
had a slightly higher share of manufactures in total GDP, but both exported a similar proportion
of primary goods and manufactures. In other words, at the beginning of the ’60s South Korea and
Philippines had a similar macroeconomic background. Nevertheless, during the following twenty-ﬁve
years the former experienced sustained growth – about 6% – fully undertaking the industrialization
process, while the latter grew at a speed of about one third – less than 2% – remaining mainly an
agricultural economy. Lucas classiﬁed the case of Korea as a sort of productivity miracle.2
Interestingly, moving the attention to the distribution of income and land ownership, one ﬁnds
no such similarities. Indeed, the two countries were sensibly diﬀerent from a distributional point of
view: South Korea had a much more equal distribution of both land property rights and income
than Philippines. Remarkably, the ratio between income of the top 20% population and that of the
bottom 20% – or even 40% – was nearly twice bigger in Philippines. The Gini coeﬃcient for land
ownership was 38.7 in Korea in 1961 and 53.4 in Philippines in 1960.3
These distributive diﬀerences contribute to explain the best economic performance of Korea over
Philippines, particularly in the early years of industrialization. A more equal distribution of income
and land ownership granted Korea a greater and more stable domestic demand of basic manufactures
which made investments in mass production technologies more proﬁtable. Labour division increased
productivity and generated a greater surplus that, due to a more equal distribution, transformed into
a higher income for a vast majority of the population. Higher income further raised domestic demand
sustaining early growth. In other words, Korean chaebols – which now are leading world exporters
of manufactures – in their early stage of development relied on domestic demand.
Clearly, there are other crucial factors which have been relevant as well. However, our point is
rather simple and jointly applies with diﬀerent explanations: if the industrial technology has increas-
ing returns and domestic demand depends on the distribution of income, then the actual distribution
of land property rights can aﬀect both income growth and industrialization by determining the prof-
itability of mass production.4
1See B´ enabou [6] for more comments on this economic puzzle.
2See Lucas [23].
3This latter diﬀerence is the eﬀect of the land reform undertaken by the Government of South Korea in 1949 which
took the name of Agricultural Land Reform Amendment Act (ALRAA). It consisted mostly of the redistribution of
land previously owned by Japanese people. ALRAA reduced the number of tenants to nearly zero in a couple of years
(see Jeon and Kim [19]).
4Chenery and Syrquin [11], Chenery et al. [10] provide further empirical evidence of the relevance of domestic
demand for industrialization. Using a sample of rapidly growing economies they show that the expansion of domestic
demand accounts for a large part of the increase of domestic income. For the biggest countries in their sample, domestic
demand explains more than 70 percent of the increase of domestic income, while in small countries (under 20 million
people) the percentage diminishes until a minimum of 50 percent. See also Murphy et al. [25] section II.
12. Related literature
The process of industrial development has always been an object of inquiry in economics.5 Following
Adam Smith, early economists interpreted industrialization as a substantial increase in labour pro-
ductivity due to the increase of labour division and specialization. We share with them the idea that
the adoption of increasing return technologies is often associated with the growth of manufactures’
demand.
Between 1940s and 1960s, several contributions analysed the eﬀects of export booms and agri-
cultural productivity improvements (see, for instance, Rosenstein-Rodan [29], Lewis [20] [21] and
Fleming [13]). This literature has mainly focused on exogenous shocks and their persistent eﬀects,
with scarce reference to distributional issues.
In the late 1980s, Murphy et al. [24] proposed a model of early industrialization where the takeoﬀ is
sustained by domestic demand and the extent of industrialization is determined by the distribution of
income. They studied the relationship between income distribution and the size of domestic demand.
Assuming that a fraction of the labour force receives proﬁts and rents, they investigated how the
distribution of shares inﬂuences the extent of industrialization by modifying the proﬁtability of mass
production. We replicate some results provided by Murphy et al. [24] under diﬀerent distributional
assumptions, which allow us to analyse in greater detail how the distribution of land property rights
aﬀects the distribution of proﬁts and, in turn, income and industrialization.
More recently, the relationships between distribution, growth and industrialization have been anal-
ysed from a variety of perspectives. A ﬁrst group of contributions links inequality and growth arguing
that, whenever there are imperfections in asset markets, people without the necessary collateral may
be prevented from undertaking the eﬃcient level of investment (see Loury [22], Galor and Zeira [15],
Aghion and Bolton [3]). A second group looks at the interaction of income distribution and the
political system ﬁnding that, under a democratic regime, inequality is detrimental to growth because
it pushes towards higher taxation and lower incentives for investments (see Bertola [8], Alesina and
Rodrik [4], Persson and Tabellini [27]). A third group focuses on institutional issues claiming that
greater inequality increases social conﬂict and reduces the enforcement of property rights, negatively
aﬀecting investment (see Grossman [16] [17], Acemoglu [1], Benhabib and Rustichini [7]). A fourth
group, taking again an institutional perspective, emphasizes the importance of the conﬂict between
interest groups in presence of technological choices (see Parente and Prescott [26], Acemoglu and
Robinson [2]). Diﬀerently from these contributions we take a more traditional approach focusing on
the demand side. We emphasize that land ownership distribution matters not only because of mar-
ket imperfections or institutional complementarities but also because it directly shapes production
incentives.
A work much closer to ours is the study by Galor et al. [14] which analyses how the distribution
of land property rights aﬀects growth via education. They argue that the more unequal is the
distribution of land ownership the later educational reforms are introduced, with a strong negative
impact on human capital.6 They identify an indirect eﬀect linking the power of landowners to
5For a short survey of the view points of classical economists on this topic see Fiaschi and Signorino [12], and also
Rosenberg [28] and Brewer [9].
6They provide empirical evidence from US in the period 1880-1920.
2inﬂuence political institutions to the implementation of educational reforms.
3. An overview of the paper
The basic structure of our model is a variant of Murphy et al. [24] where it is assumed a functional
division of income among social classes, namely landowners, capitalists and workers. A widespread
ownership of ﬁrms’ shares is typical of economies in advanced stages of industrialization while it is
exceptional for countries which are about their takeoﬀ. Therefore, we assume that each entrepreneur
is also the capitalist and, hence, retains the proﬁts of the ﬁrm she manages.7 Moreover, such a
variation allows us to investigate the eﬀects of intra- and inter-group distributional relationships.
In particular, we focus on the impact of land concentration on the distribution of proﬁts among
capitalists.
The economy we describe is composed of two sectors: agriculture, which provides food, and manu-
facturing, constituted by a continuum of markets each providing a diﬀerent commodity. Consumption
is assumed to be incremental in the sense that the higher is the income the greater the variety of
goods consumed. In particular, all individuals have the same tastes and demand goods according to
the same schedule of priorities.
Industrialization is conceived as the substitution of a traditional technology – showing constant
returns to scale – with an industrial one – showing increasing returns to scale. In each manufacturing
market, artisans using traditional technologies compete with each other driving proﬁts to zero. A
single artisan per market has access to the industrial technology. Provided demand is high enough,
she can become an entrepreneur and monopolize the market making positive proﬁts.
We ﬁrst analyse economies where industrialization does not take place. Three diﬀerent kinds can
be distinguished: a) subsistence economies, where only food is produced and consumed and there
are only landowners and land workers; b) small economies, where a manufacturing sector exists but
the population is too small to make entrepreneurship and mass production proﬁtable; c) traditional
economies, where wages are at subsistence level but there is a manufacturing sector producing only
for landowners. We take traditional economies as the standard case of non-industrialization, since
it a stylized picture of many non-industrial countries. Then, by comparing the eﬀects of diﬀerent
distributions of land property rights we show that, ceteris paribus, the relationship between land
concentration and income as well as that between land concentration and industrialization are non-
monotonic.8
Not surprisingly, diﬀerent degrees of land ownership concentration produce quite diﬀerent patterns
of industrialization and income in equilibrium. We use two measures of the degree of industrialization:
the number of markets which adopt the industrial technology, the extent of industrialization, and
the number of workers hired by ﬁrms operating the industrial technology, the industrial employment.
The maximum extent of industrialization is reached for an intermediate level of land concentration.
In particular, the variety of goods produced with the industrial technology is maximal when each
operating market is industrialized, and demand in all markets is just suﬃcient to cover start-up costs
7We use the terms entrepreneur and capitalist interchangeably.
8Diﬀerently from Rosenstein-Rodan’s [29], in this model there is no direct spillover accruing from industrialization.
Indeed, only one equilibrium is determined for any given set of parameters and there is no coordination problem.
3and grant proﬁts equal to the opportunity cost of labour wage. Instead, the maximum income is gen-
erally obtained for a lower extent of industrialization – i.e. for a broader distribution of land property
rights. The reason is that increasing returns are better exploited when demand is concentrated in
less markets.
We also show that a too equal distribution of land property rights can be detrimental to in-
dustrialization and income. Many “poor” landowners demand only few very basic manufactures,
concentrating the beneﬁts of industrialization into the hands of very few entrepreneurs. This induces
a very unequal distribution between capitalists and everyone else with the consequence that the de-
mand of manufactures produced with the industrial technology is rather low and mass production is
not properly exploited.
For what concerns maximum industrial employment, we ﬁnd that it is obtained for a level of
land ownership concentration which is in-between the level associated to the maximum industrial
extent and that associated to maximum income, possibly coinciding with either of them. Industrial
employment increases with the intensity of exploitation of the increasing return technology – like
income – but decreases with the number of industrialized markets – like industrial extent. However,
a more intensive exploitation is often possible only at the cost of reducing the range of industrialized
markets. So, more industrial employment does not necessarily coincide with more income or more
industrialized markets. In Section IV and in the Appendix we illustrate a variety of cases.
The paper is organized as follows: section II presents the basic model; section III characterizes the
equilibrium of the model; section IV compares equilibria with diﬀerent distribution of land property
rights; section V explores some extensions of the model; section VI contains concluding remarks.
2. The Model
1. Commodities and Consumption Patterns
There is a single homogeneous divisible agricultural good. For simplicity we label it food and use it as
numeraire. Moreover, there is a continuum of manufactured goods represented by the open interval
[0,∞) ∈ <. Each good is denoted by its distance q from the origin. The consumption pattern – or
tastes, if one prefers – is assumed to be the same for each individual. There is a subsistence level of
food consumption ¯ ω. After that, any unit of income is spent to buy the manufactured goods following
their order in the interval.
Such assumption is meant to introduce in a simple way a common ranking of necessities: people
ﬁrst need to buy what is necessary to survive, then basic manufactures and durables which allow
better life standards and, only after that, they buy luxuries. For simplicity, we assume that only one
unit is bought of any manufactured good. In other terms, any individual with income ω ≥ ¯ ω uses
her ﬁrst ¯ ω of income to purchase food needed to survive and (ω − ¯ ω) to purchase the manufactured
goods. Any individual with ω < ¯ ω starves.
It is worth pointing out the intuitive consequences of our assumptions. First, individuals are
almost identical for what concerns consumption decisions and they only diﬀer in terms of income.
Thus, a landowner and her servants would consume the same if given the same income. Second, any
4increase of income results in an increase of consumption variety. In particular, richer people buy the
same bundle of poorer people plus some other commodities.
2. The Agricultural Sector
In order to produce food it is necessary to use land and labour. We abstract from land and assume
it is always fully utilized in production. For the sake of simplicity, we also assume all workers have
the same skills – labour is homogenous – and perfect competition in the output side – no proﬁts are
earned.
Technology and Incomes. Given the amount of land utilized, labour has decreasing marginal pro-
ductivity. Total production is determined by the function F(Lf) where Lf is the number of workers
employed in agriculture. It is assumed F0 > 0, F00 < 0. Agricultural wage wf is a function of
agricultural employment with w0
f(LF) < 0. This formalization is consistent with the case in which
labour is paid its marginal product.
Since proﬁts are nil, income generated in agriculture is exhausted by land workers’ wages and
landowners’ rents. Denoting with R the total amount of rents earned, we have the account equation
R = F(Lf) − wfLf (1)
Land Ownership. Diﬀerently from Murphy et al. [24], we assume property rights of the land stock
to be equally distributed among M landowners. We also assume that the income of each landowner
is equal to R/M and, hence, is negatively related to their number. The idea is that, on average, the
greater is the number of landowners the smaller is the area of land they posses and, therefore, the
smaller the rent they earn. Although a non-uniform distribution of land property rights is the norm,
our simpliﬁcation works well as long as the average concentration is the relevant feature. In this
sense, M should be interpreted as a rough index of land property concentration. Finally, we abstract
from the issue of productivity change due to variations in the extent of land ownership, such as that
described in Banerjee et al. [5].9
3. The Manufacturing Sector
We consider a continuum of markets where each of them is small with respect to the entire economy.
The number of workers employed in the manufacturing sector as a whole is denoted by Lm while the
ruling wage is wm.
Technology and Markets. Each commodity q is produced with the same cost structure. Two tech-
nologies are available. The ﬁrst, labelled traditional technology or TT, requires α units of labour in
order to produce a unit of output. This represents the case in which commodities are produced by
9The qualitative results of our model can be obtained also by allowing for an increase in productivity due to the
reduced dimension of land property. However, the analysis would become more complicated and would somehow
obscure the mechanism we want to highlight.
5artisans who, at the same time, organize production and work as other wage-paid labourers. For this
reason, the number of workers in TT markets includes also artisans. The second, labelled industrial
technology or IT, requires k units of labour to start up plus β units of labour per unit of output
produced, with 0 < β < α. This represents the case where a former artisan becomes an entrepreneur
exploiting the beneﬁts of mass production.
Furthermore, we assume (k +1) > (α−β) which means that the amount (α−β) of labour saved
producing one unit of output using IT is less than the ﬁxed amount k needed to introduce the IT
plus the unit of labour provided by the artisan. Clearly, this is the only interesting case because if
(k + 1) ≤ (α − β) IT never requires more units of labour with respect to TT and, hence, it is always
preferred by artisans. Lastly, we denote by E the number of entrepreneurs.
Notice that TT shows constant returns to scale while IT shows increasing returns. The diﬀerence
between these two technologies represents the economic advantage of industrialization.
Competition and Income. A group of competing artisans is assumed to operate in each market q of
the economy. Given a wage wm, any amount of commodities can be produced and sold at the unit
price αwm. No proﬁts are earned by artisans. Besides, in each market q there exists one and only
one artisan who knows IT. She has the choice to become an entrepreneur introducing IT or to hold
on with her current business as an artisan. If she decides to be an entrepreneur she can become a
monopolist by slightly undercutting the price αwm. In this case nobody buys the good produced
with TT and proﬁts of market q are
π(q) = (pq − βwm)Dq − kwm (2)
where pq is the price and Dq is the demand.
4. Population and Labour Market .
Agricultural employment determines the ruling wage wf. Workers of the manufacturing sector are
not paid the marginal product but instead their wage depends on customs, necessities, pressure
generated by the agricultural wage and the mobility of labour between the two sectors. We assume
perfect mobility of labour among sectors and markets so that wf = wm = w.
The active population is denoted by L and each worker either supplies inelastically one unit of
labour or becomes an entrepreneur. The total supply of labour is hence equal to L−E. Finally, the
population is assumed to be ﬁxed and equal to N = L + M where L = Lf + Lm + E.
3. Equilibrium
In this section we characterize the equilibrium of the described economy as a function of the number
of landowners M, the wage level w, the available labour force L and technology, denoted by F for
agriculture and by the vector τ ≡ (α,β,k) for manufactures.
6Since we want the economy to actually produce commodities, we assume that the ruling wage w
is not less than the subsistence level ¯ ω, otherwise no worker would supply labour.10 For the sake of
realism, we also assume that the rent of a single landowner R/M is not lower than w. The same
holds for proﬁts as artisans knowing the IT decide to become entrepreneurs if and only if πq ≥ w.11
The demand of food is given by
Df = (Lf + Lm + E + M) ¯ ω = ¯ ωN (3)
while the supply of food is
Sf = F(Lf) (4)
As regards the manufacturing sector, we have to take into account how prices inﬂuence both aggregate
demand and supply. The price of commodities produced with TT is, as mentioned above, αw as a
consequence of competition among artisans. The price of commodities produced with IT is set by
entrepreneurs in order to maximize proﬁts. Since consumers buy manufactured goods following a
well speciﬁed order and at most one of each kind, in any market the elasticity of demand with respect
to the price is 0.12 Hence, entrepreneurs ﬁnd convenient to rise prices as much as possible. However,
the level αw constitutes an upper bound because, for any price greater than that, nobody would buy
commodities from them. Therefore, each entrepreneur sets the price pq = αw, implying that the
price of each commodity is αw independently of how many markets industrialize.
Besides, it takes only one’s moment reﬂection to realize that the demand faced by each manufac-
turing market is non-increasing in q. Since poorer people simply consumes a bundle of commodities
which is a subset of richer ones, it cannot happen that for two markets q0 and q00, such that q0 < q00,
we have Dq0 < Dq00. Moreover, entrepreneurs face the same cost structure, so in each sector they
ﬁnd convenient to start their business for the same level of Dq. The last two observations imply that
there is a separating market Q∗ such that IT is introduced in any 0 ≤ q ≤ Q∗ while in the remaining
markets production is carried out by means of TT. So, we have that the aggregate demand of the









(π(q,τ,w) − ¯ ω)dq
#
(5)
and aggregate supply is
10It is possible that agricultural productivity is so low that wf is less than ¯ ω. To rule out this case we apply a
standard Malthusian argument. When w < ¯ ω population reduces and the agricultural sector employs less and less
workers until labour productivity is high enough to sustain a wage level equal to ¯ ω. So in equilibrium w ≥ ¯ ω. The
Malthusian argument does not apply for w > ¯ ω, because the remaining wage (w − ¯ ω) is spent in the manufacturing
sector and population does not change.
11It could be objected that we do not consider the possibility of people having a preference for being an entrepreneur
or a landowner (because of the social status granted, the disutility of eﬀort, etc). We have not explicitly taken into
account this issue because, although reasonable, it would add very little to our results.






where ¯ Q denotes the extent of the manufacturing sector and Sq the supply of the market q. Finally,
the demand of labour is
Dl = Lf + Lm (7)
and, as anticipated, the supply is
Sl = L − Q∗ (8)
since the number of entrepreneurs is E = Q∗.
In equilibrium it must simultaneously hold that Df = Sf, Dm = Sm and Dl = Sl. We assume
that the economy can sustain the whole population N = (L + M), that is F(L) ≥ ¯ ωN. Hence, from






which is fully determined as F(Lf) is invertible with respect to Lf and the parameters N and ¯ ω are
given. In particular the equilibrium levels of wage, employment and output in the agricultural sector
are independent of the equilibrium of the manufacturing sector since the aggregate demand of food is
¯ ωN in any case. From Dl = Sl and L∗
f we get the equilibrium value (L−L∗
f) of people with a job in
the manufacturing sector (workers, artisans or entrepreneurs). From L∗
f we obtain w(L∗
f); then, M,
F and τ determine the extent of the manufacturing sector ¯ Q. We are left with only two unknowns,
namely Q∗ and L∗





































where R∗ is the equilibrium level of aggregate rents. Now, exploiting Dm = Sm, equation (2) and




















Dqdq + kQ∗ (11)
8The ﬁrst term of equation (11) represents the labour employed in markets using the TT while the
sum of the second and the third terms represents the labour employed in the industrialized markets.
Since any entrepreneur in q starts her business depending on the value of Dq, the extent of
industrialization Q∗ is univocally determined by the continuum of demands in (0, ¯ Q). Although we
have not yet provided an expression for any of those demand functions, in the Appendix we illustrate
the mechanism of proﬁts formation and industrialization, showing that for each q the demand Dq is
univocally determined by population, land ownership distribution and technology. So, the only real
unknown variable is L∗
m, and equation (11) leaves no degree of freedom.
Land Ownership, Proﬁts and Industrialization. In order to give the intuition of the relation be-
tween income distribution and industrialization we focus on equilibrium outcomes for diﬀerent land
ownership concentrations.
Consider the economy we have described so far and assume that the agricultural sector is already
in equilibrium. Denote with Ωm the total expenditure in manufactures and with ωi the income of in-
dividual i. Since every consumer who has already bought ¯ ω units of food spends her remaining income
to get a unit of each manufacture in the speciﬁed order, the demand Dq faced by a generic market q
is determined by the number of individuals who earn enough income to buy at least commodity q,
namely individuals satisfying (ωi − ¯ ω)/αw > q.
Assume that workers are poor and consume only food, namely w = ¯ ω. Then, the distribution of
land property rights shapes the demand for manufactures by determining the income of individuals
who buy manufactures. For instance, if there are only few rich landowners the extent of the man-
ufacturing sector is quite large, although the demand faced by each market is relatively small. On
the contrary, if there is a large number of low income landowners, the extent of the manufacturing
sector is smaller but the demand faced by each operating market is greater. The distribution of
land property rights also aﬀects the absolute level of Ωm. In particular, the higher is land ownership
concentration the higher is Ωm because less income is spent in food and therefore the fraction of rents
spent in manufactures is higher.
Since IT is introduced only if demand goes over a certain proﬁtability threshold, a too concentrated
ownership of land prevents the takeoﬀ even if Ωm is great. On the contrary, if land ownership is
distributed so that the threshold is outdone, some markets industrialize and entrepreneurs make
positive proﬁts. This start a multiplicative process of demand sustained by entrepreneurs’ earnings.
The interesting thing is that this extra demand can well oﬀset the negative eﬀect of a lower aggregate
demand by landowners with the result that a broader distribution of land is even more income
enhancing. The multiplicative eﬀect arises because the extra demand increases aggregate proﬁts
possibly inducing a further increase in Ωm.13 Such a process can go on for several steps – proﬁts, new
demand, new proﬁts – but in each step the amount of new proﬁts decreases because the new demand
partially goes to cover production costs which are constituted by wages spent in food. In particular,
the process ends when new generated proﬁts fail to industrialize new markets or to generate extra
demand for markets already industrialized.
13The precise outcome depends on how proﬁts are distributed among entrepreneurs. We investigate this issue in the
following sections and in the Appendix.
9Summing up, diﬀerent distributions of land property rights determine, in equilibrium, diﬀerent
scenarios of industrialization and income. In our view, this support the idea that land ownership
distribution may be relevant to industrialization and income growth.
4. Analysis
1. Non-industrial Economies
We start illustrating those conditions which may prevent a country from industrializing. In order for
a market q to operate the IT proﬁts πq must be not less than the ruling wage w. Since, as mentioned
above, τ is the same in each market and q0 < q00 implies Dq0 ≥ Dq00, a necessary and suﬃcient
condition for no industrialization is π0 < w. From equation (2) we get
π0 < w ⇐⇒ D0 < ρ (12)
where ρ ≡ (k + 1)/(α − β). Equation (12) states that in equilibrium no market industrializes if and
only if the demand faced by the ﬁrst market is less than the value which allows to cover start-up
costs plus the opportunity cost of quitting the previous job. Neglecting proﬁts – which however are





0 if w = ¯ ω, R/M = ¯ ω
M if w = ¯ ω, R/M > ¯ ω
L + M if w > ¯ ω, R/M > ¯ ω
(13)
Any consumer who earns more than ¯ ω demands at least the 0-commodity which implies that for
R/M > ¯ ω demand D0 is at least M and for R/M ≥ w > ¯ ω it is M + L. So, the no industrialization
condition of equation (12) can be satisﬁed by a variety of triples (L,M,τ). In the next paragraphs
we group them in three classes of interest.
Subsistence economy. In a subsistence economy only food is produced and consumed and there is
no manufacturing sector. In this case the ruling wage is w = ¯ ω and L, F(Lf) and M are such that
M+L = F(L)/¯ ω. Substituting M in equation (9) we obtain L∗
f = L meaning that all the labour force
of the economy is employed in agriculture. From equations (7) and (8) we get L∗
m = 0, E = Q∗ = 0.
Given the level of agricultural productivity, the number of landowners with respect to population
is too high to allow for industrialization. The excessive dispersion of land property rights makes
landowners’ individual rents R/M as low as ¯ ω, fully oﬀsetting the beneﬁts accruing from a wage
equal to the subsistence level. As a consequence, no one demands manufactured goods and there is
no manufacturing sector.
Traditional economy. In a traditional economy workers earn just what is needed to keep population
stable while few landowners are rich enough to demand manufactures. There exists a manufacturing
sector but mass production is still not proﬁtable and commodities are all produced with the traditional
10technology. In this case w = ¯ ω and L, F(Lf) and M are such that M + L < F(L)/¯ ω and M < ρ.
From equation (9) we get L∗
f < L and R/M > ¯ ω.14 Landowners spend (R/M − ¯ ω) in manufactures
consuming commodities in [0,QR] where QR = (R − ¯ ωM)/α¯ ωM. Since each operating market faces
a demand Dq = M < ρ, no market industrializes. Hence, the extent of the manufacturing sector
coincides with the extent of landowners demand, ¯ Q = QR, as shown in Figure 1. From equations (7)
and (8) we also get L∗
m = L − L∗
f implying E = Q∗ = 0.
In this economy land concentration prevents industrialization because, although landowners are









¯ Q = QR
Figure 1. Traditional economy
Small economy. In a small economy both workers and landowners are rich enough to demand man-
ufactures but population is so small that the industrial technology is still not proﬁtable. In this case
R/M ≥ w > ¯ ω and M + L < ρ. As before, from equation (9) we get L∗
f < L. Notice that there is
an upper bound for w constituted by the level of wages which reduces the rent of each landowner to
¯ ω, namely L¯ ω/L∗
f.15 So, for w < L¯ ω/L∗
f both workers and landowners demand manufactures. Let
14Since L∗
f < L, in equilibrium we have
M < L + M − L∗
f ⇐⇒ ¯ ω <
(L + M)¯ ω − L∗
f ¯ ω
M

















¯ ω(M + L) − wL∗
f
M
> ¯ ω ⇐⇒ ¯ ωL − wL∗
f > 0
11QL ≡ (w − ¯ ω)/αw be the extent of workers’ demand and QR be, as before, the extent of landowners
demand. In a small economy markets in [0,QL] face a demand equal to Dq = (L + M) < ρ while
markets in (QL,QR] get a demand equal to M < ρ, as shown in Figure 2. Hence, no market indus-
trializes and the extent of the manufacturing sector is ¯ Q = QR. Exploiting equations (7) and (8) we
obtain L∗
m = L − L∗
f and E = Q∗ = 0.16
In this economy, industrialization is prevented by the small population size and not by distribution.
Indeed, even if agricultural productivity is high enough to grant both workers and landowners a very
high income, their small number makes mass production unproﬁtable. In this case the manufacturing













Figure 2. Small economy (QR > QL)
2. Industrialization Driven by Landowners Demand
Workers of countries in an early stage of industrialization frequently experience subsistence wages.
In order to focus on such a case we assume that w = ¯ ω. Besides, this simpliﬁcation allows us to
isolate the eﬀects of landownership distribution and, hence, to study it in greater detail. For the sake
of completeness, in next section we sketch what happens for higher wages, although we leave its full
analysis to further research.
We proceed comparing the equilibrium values of aggregate income, industrial extent and industrial
employment which are obtained for diﬀerent degrees of land concentration. Since calculations are
16For completeness notice that by assuming R/M ≥ w we have ruled out the case of ¯ ω < w = L¯ ω/L∗
f where only
workers demand manufactures. In such a case, Dq = L for any q in [0,QL] and an extent of the manufacturing sector
equal to ¯ Q = QL.
12not particularly enlightening and rather long, we collect them in the Appendix providing here only
results and their interpretation.
As we have pointed out for traditional economies, if M < ρ no artisan introduces the IT. Hence,
both industrial extent and employment are nil. In this case, the income of the economy is equal to
Y ∗ = R∗ + ¯ ω(L∗
f + L∗
m) = R∗ + ¯ ωN − ¯ ωM
Since N and R∗ are constant, Y ∗ decreases in M meaning that a more equal distribution of land
property rights reduces aggregate income. The reason is that there are more landowners and hence
less people work. On the demand side, aggregate demand of manufactures decreases in M because
the quota of rents spent on food increases.
For M = ρ we have a sharp change. Assuming for simplicity that IT is introduced whenever
it is not disadvantageous to do it, we have that industrial extent jumps to Q∗ = QR = ¯ Q and no
commodity is produced with the TT. Artisans operating in markets [0,QR] who know the IT become
entrepreneurs, although they still earn as much as a worker. Similarly, industrial employment jumps
to
L∗
IT = βMQR + kQR
where the ﬁrst term accounts for workers in direct production and the second one for those involved
in start-up tasks. On the contrary, aggregate income which is equal to
Y ∗ = R∗ + Π∗ + ¯ ωN − ¯ ω (M + QR) = R∗ + ¯ ωN − ¯ ωM
does not increase with respect to any equilibrium with no industrialization. This happens because
increasing returns are exploited just enough to grant entrepreneurs an income of ¯ ω which implies
Π∗ = ¯ ωQR.
For M > ρ, we have positive industrialization. Moreover, some entrepreneurs are rich enough to
spend part of their proﬁts in manufactures. This generates new demand starting the multiplicative
mechanism described in the previous section. Furthermore, Since each entrepreneur makes proﬁts
depending on the units of output sold, diﬀerent distributive scenarios are possible. In particular,
there exists a level of M, which we denoted by µ, such that: i) for M = µ, all entrepreneurs and
landowners are equally rich, ii) for M < µ entrepreneurs make heterogenous proﬁts but all are
poorer than landowners and iii) for M > µ entrepreneurs again make heterogenous proﬁts but those
operating in [0,QR] are richer than landowners while the remaining are poorer.17 We shall treat
these three cases separately.
For M ≤ µ the extent of industrialization Q∗ decreases in the number of landowners M. This
happens because landowners are the richest consumers and, hence, the extent of industrialization
coincides with the extent of landowners demand QR which decreases in M. Since no one demands
17In the Appendix we show that
µ =
α(k + 1) − β +
q
(α(k + 1) − β)2 + 4 αβ(α − β) R
¯ w
2(α − β)α
13commodities beyond QR, no good is produced with the TT and Q∗ = QR = ¯ Q. For what concerns





− (M + QR) (14)
Notice that L∗
IT is equal to the number of people who are not employed as agricultural workers,
R∗/¯ ω = (N −L∗
f), minus the sum of landowners and entrepreneurs, (M +QR). Since QR diminishes
in M at a decreasing rate we have, from equation (14), that L∗
IT can increase, decrease, or ﬁrst
increase and then decrease. Similarly, aggregate income is
Y ∗ = R∗ + ¯ ωN + Π∗ − ¯ ω(M + QR) (15)
and is not, in general, monotonic in M.18 In the range under consideration it can either increase or
ﬁrst increase and then decrease. The term Π∗−¯ ω(M+QR) determines its actual behaviour depending
on two opposite eﬀects induced by a greater M. On the one hand, the concentration of landowners
demand in fewer markets allows a better exploitation of increasing returns while, on the other, a
higher quota of rents spent in subsistence reduces aggregate landowners demand of manufactures.
Whether the ﬁrst or the second eﬀect prevails – and, hence, if Y ∗ increases or decreases – depends
on aggregate proﬁts. Indeed, although the number of entrepreneurs declines in M we have that, on
average, they become richer so that the total eﬀect on Y ∗ is ambiguous.
For M > µ entrepreneurs in [0,QR] demand commodities beyond QR. If their number is high
enough – namely QR ≥ ρ – also the markets facing only their demand industrialize. Moreover, since
QR > ρ, also entrepreneurs of these markets demand manufactures which, in turn, increases the earn-
ings of some entrepreneurs in [0,QR]. Notice that these entrepreneurs are the richest among capitalists
since their products are demanded by all who buy manufactures. In particular, the additional proﬁts
they earn transforms in demand of new kinds of commodities. So, if their number is greater than ρ,
also the artisans producing these new commodities adopt IT and becomes entrepreneurs.
Such a process may go on for several rounds, each time industrializing an additional interval of
markets. For simplicity, we refer to the number of such intervals as the number of steps and denote
it by i∗. Clearly, i∗ is a non-increasing step function of M but a greater i∗ does not imply a greater
Q∗. In particular, Q∗ is determined by the income of the richest group of entrepreneurs among those
of dimension not less than ρ and can be written as
















The ﬁrst term accounts for the positive eﬀect produced by the concentration of landowners demand
in basic manufactures which allows the richest entrepreneurs to make more proﬁts and, hence, to
extend their demand. The magnitude of this eﬀect increases, ceteris paribus, in the number of steps
because more steps imply more groups of entrepreneurs demanding to the richest group. The second
term accounts for the negative eﬀect produced by the reduction of the extent of landowners demand
which, other things being equal, reduces the number of industrialized markets and, hence, the demand
18The expression for Π∗ is quite complicated and adds very little by itself. It can be found in the Appendix.
14faced by the richest group of entrepreneurs. The magnitude of this negative eﬀect decreases in the
number of steps because it is partially compensated by the industrialization of more markets which
does not face landowners demand.19 As a result, the extent of industrialization can both increase
and/or decrease in M, possibly showing discontinuous variations when M reaches values which imply
a decrease in i∗. Moreover, apart from such points of discontinuity, we have that ¯ Q > Q∗. Indeed,
the few richest entrepreneurs demand commodities produced with the TT and a traditional sector
survives.20





− (M + Q∗) − L∗
TT (17)
where L∗
TT is the number of workers producing with TT. For any feasible value of i∗ and the associated
range of M, L∗
TT can both increase or decrease in M. So, taking into account the behaviour of Q∗,
we have that also L∗
IT can increase and/or decrease and possibly show discontinuities in coincidence
with the reduction of i∗.
Finally, aggregate income is given by21
Y ∗ = R∗ + ¯ ωN + Π∗ − ¯ ω(M + Q∗) (18)
As for M < µ, Y ∗ can either decrease or ﬁrst increase and then decrease. The intuition is funda-
mentally the same given for that case, although here income is more likely to decrease in M. For
ρ ≤ M < µ landowners are the richest group in society and no one demands commodities produced
with TT. As a consequence, all proﬁts are transformed in extra demand for industrial goods except
what is spent in subsistence. On the contrary, for M > µ some entrepreneurs are the richest group
in society and demand commodities produced with TT so that the fraction of proﬁts which generate
additional income is lower. Therefore, in such a case it is more likely that Y ∗ decreases in M, even
when a greater M implies greater proﬁts for the richest entrepreneurs.
3. Maxima: Aggregate Income, Industrial Extent and Employment
So far, we have shown that aggregate income, industrial extent and industrial employment have a
non-monotonic relationship with land concentration. The next step is to identify the values of M
which gives the maximal levels of these variables. Quite interestingly, it turns out that maxima are
not achieved for the same distribution of land ownership. This suggests that there is a trade oﬀ
between income and industrialization during the early stages of industrialization.
The maximum Q∗, which we denote by c Q∗, is obtained for M = ρ. The reason is the following.
For M < ρ no market industrializes so M must not be less than ρ. Notice that, for M = ρ, all
19Of course, there exists a level of M such that i∗ = 0. In such a case no market beyond QR industrializes and
Q∗ = QR as for M < µ; moreover, there are commodities produced with TT and the extent of the manufacturing
sector ¯ Q is still equal to the extent of entrepreneurs demand (they earn the same proﬁts).
20In the discontinuity points where a change in I∗ takes place we have that the richest group of entrepreneurs has
not less than ρ members so that ¯ Q = Q∗ and production with TT disappears.
21Again, the expression for Π∗ is provided in the Appendix.
15workers of the manufacturing sector produce with the IT and industrial employment is the minimum
which allows to industrialize until b Q∗. Moreover, the maximum number of people employable as
industrial workers is (N − L∗
f − M − Q∗). Therefore, for M > ρ it is impossible to have Q∗ ≥ c Q∗
because there are not enough workers. So, the maximum extent of industrialization is obtained for
the distribution of land which produces a demand of manufactures just suﬃcient to industrialize
markets in [0,QR], making entrepreneurs earn as much as workers and landowners the richest in
society. Furthermore, comparative statics gives the expected results. A higher k requires landowners
to be in greater number in order to make IT proﬁtable while, for the same reason, a higher (α − β)
has an opposite eﬀect.
On the contrary, the M which gives the maximum Y ∗, denoted by b Y ∗, depends on both τ and
F. It may happen, for instance, that Y ∗ is maximal when land is concentrated and landowners
are the richest in society as well as when land is more equally distributed and the richest group is
constituted by some entrepreneurs. It may also happen when landowners and entrepreneurs earn
exactly the same. In any case, whatever is the technology, maximum income is achieved for a level
of M which is greater than that associated with c Q∗. Indeed, for M = ρ increasing returns are
not exploited at all and income is even lower than in the traditional economy case. Hence, a more
equal distribution of land increases Y ∗ because, by inducing a greater concentration of demand in
basic manufactures, allows a better exploitation of increasing returns. On the other hand, a too
wide diﬀusion of land property rights may be detrimental. The concentration of landowners demand
in few basic manufactures has the eﬀect of concentrating most of the proﬁts into the hands of few
entrepreneurs. Since these are very rich with respect to the size of the industrial sector, they spend
a substantial part of their earnings in manufactures produced with TT.
In general, the optimal land concentration can be greater, equal or lower than µ. A higher k
increases the optimal M because increases IT’s proﬁtability threshold and, hence, requires a greater
demand concentration for optimality. A higher R∗ has the same eﬀect because increases the rela-
tive advantage of concentrating demand in few manufactures. On the contrary, a higher α reduces
the optimal M because it increases the relative price of manufactures, having the same eﬀect on
landowners demand as a reduction of rents. A higher β may or may not have an eﬀect but certainly
increases µ because it reduces the proﬁts earned for each unit sold and, hence, it increases the range
of M for which landowners are the richest. The reason of β’s ambiguous eﬀect on the optimal M is
the following. As long as M < µ, β only aﬀects the way proﬁts accruing from landowners demand
are increased by the multiplicative process. So, β can aﬀect the absolute value of b Y ∗ but not the
optimal M. Instead, in the case that the optimal M is grater than µ, a higher β reduces the former
since it contributes to determine the demand received by markets beyond QR.22
Finally, the maximum L∗
IT, denoted by b L∗
IT, is obtained for M in [ρ,µ]. The exact value depends,
again, on τ and F. To see why b L∗
IT cannot happen for M > µ recall that L∗
IT always decreases in
(M + Q∗) and that for M = µ we have L∗
TT = 0. Hence, a necessary condition to have b L∗
IT with
M > µ is that M +Q∗(M) ≤ µ+Q∗(µ) which implies Q∗(M) < Q∗(µ). So, the richest entrepreneurs
must earn less than what they earn when M = µ. This implies that the total demand faced by the
industrial sector cannot be greater than in M = µ while employment in start-up tasks is certainly
22See the Appendix for more details.
16Figure 3. An example with i∗ = 2.
lower. Therefore, the M which maximizes industrial employment cannot be greater than µ.
More precisely, b L∗
IT is obtained for M comprised between that associate with c Q∗ and that as-
sociated with c Y ∗, possibly coinciding with either of them. The actual behaviour of (M + QR) in
the interval [ρ,µ] determines its exact position. For instance, when a greater number of landowners
induces a shrinking of the interval of industrialized markets which never frees enough labour force to
compensate the increased M, then we have no tradeoﬀ between industrial extent and employment
and b L∗
IT is obtained for M = ρ. If, on the contrary, the reduction of QR always compensates for
a greater M, then b L∗
IT is obtained for M = µ. In all other cases, (M + QR) has its minimum in
the interior of [ρ,µ] and the distribution of landownership which maximizes industrial employment
is strictly comprised between that maximizing industrial extent and the one maximizing income.











Figure 4. Two more intervals of markets industrialize.
ber of people working in start-up tasks and partly behaves like aggregate income because grows in
the level of aggregate proﬁts. This result is easily understood by noticing that with there is a tradeoﬀ
between the number of workers employed in start-up tasks and the level of proﬁts.
In order to give the reader the ﬂavour of these ﬁndings we depict an example in Figure 3. It
exempliﬁes the non-monotonic relation between land distribution and industrialization/income as
well as the fact that maximal income, industrial extent and employment are not obtained for the
same distribution of land property rights. Moreover, it shows that in the range [ρ,µ] there is a tradeoﬀ
between industrialization and income. More precisely, until λ the tradeoﬀ is between industrial extent
on one side and industrial employment and income on the other. In [ρ,λ], a more equal distribution
of land concentrates landowners demand in such a way that the new workers needed for direct
production are more than those who were previously needed for the start-up tasks of markets that
no longer industrialize. So, income and industrial employment go the same way. On the contrary,
in [λ,µ] a tradeoﬀ exists between income and both industrial extent and employment. In this range,
income increases despite the decrease in industrial employment because the total number of workers
employed in direct production is still rising and industrial surplus grows. Industrial employment
decreases because the reduction of workers hired for start-up tasks is greater than new hirings for
direct production, so that a better exploitation of increasing returns does not coincide anymore with
18a greater number of industrial workers.
For M in [µ,η], land is distributed more widely and some entrepreneurs get richer than landowners.
Apart from discontinuity points, there is again a tradeoﬀ between industrial extent on one side and
industrial employment and income on the other but with the opposite sign. Besides, the multiplicative
mechanism induces the industrialization of new intervals of markets creating up to ﬁve diﬀerent
earning groups of entrepreneurs (as depicted in Figure 4). There are two intervals until the ﬁrst
discontinuity and one afterwards.
Finally, for M greater than η land ownership is so dispersed – and consequently landowners
demand so concentrated – that there are only few and very rich entrepreneurs. Their number is so
small that their demand many diﬀerent manufactures but no single market receives enough demand
to industrialize. In this range there is no longer tradeoﬀ among income, industrial employment and
industrial extent as they all decrease in M.
5. Extensions
1. Agricultural Productivity and Wages
Our analysis conﬁrms the common wisdom that technical improvements in the agricultural sec-
tor can lead to industrialization. A slightly modiﬁed version of the model shows how a greater
agricultural productivity can push the economy to a new equilibrium with more extensive indus-
trialization and higher income level. Suppose F = F(Lf,γ) where γ is a productivity parameter.
Assume dL∗
f(γ)/dγ < 0 meaning that the equilibrium employment in agriculture decreases as a con-
sequence of higher agricultural productivity. This implies that wages increase with productivity, that
is dw(γ)/dγ > 0. Hence, any increase in agricultural productivity has two eﬀects. The ﬁrst is a
reduction of L∗
f which allows both a greater number of entrepreneurs Q∗ and a greater industrial
employment L∗
IT. Indeed, it is well a established point that industrialization feeds on the freeing of
workers from agriculture who go to increase the labour supply of the industrial sector. The second
eﬀect, on the contrary, is less recognized and is, to some extent, surprising. A higher agricultural pro-
ductivity traduces in higher workers wages implying higher production costs and commodities prices.
So, one expects that a higher γ damages both traditional and industrial markets because, although
it may increase proﬁts of some entrepreneurs who beneﬁt from higher prices, it reduces the extent
of consumers demand. In general, this is not true. A higher w can well beneﬁt the manufacturing
sector. Firstly, the impact of a higher γ on landowners demand is ambiguous as R may be aﬀected
in either ways. Secondly, richer workers demand more manufactures as (w − ¯ ω)/αw increases in w.
Therefore, assuming workers outnumber landowners, it can easily happen that a higher γ implies a
higher demand for many markets with the result that both industrial extent and employment are
greater.
This brief digression highlights the relevance of how the beneﬁts accruing from a high agricultural
productivity are shared between workers and landowners. Suppose agricultural productivity is very
high and only few workers are employed in the agricultural sector. In this case there would be
potential for a quite large industrial sector. However, if land is concentrated in the hands of few
19landowners and w is close to the subsistence level then in equilibrium no substantial industrialization
takes place. The reason is that since few landowners are taking for themselves most of the beneﬁts
of the increased agricultural productivity, demand is highly dispersed and the manufacturing sector
is large but only very few markets, if any, industrialize.
2. Exports
The model we have described so far provides insights also about the impact of export booms on
industrialization. Naturally, there are many cases where domestic demand is not the unique source
of potential purchases, even in traditional economies. Positive shocks on either international price
or demand of tradables may induce export booms at the country level and help the industrialization
process. Such positive eﬀects, however, are not guaranteed. The case of Colombia reported by
Harbison [18] is illuminating. During the years between 1850 and 1870 Colombia experienced a
strong increase in revenues accruing from tobacco exports. Unfortunately, this did not result in any
signiﬁcant increase of domestic demand of manufactures and the small industrial sector of the country
did not beneﬁt from it. A second export boom took place in Colombia between 1880 and 1915 but
this time it was coﬀee-driven. Interestingly, it was beneﬁcial not only to the coﬀee-related businesses
but to the colombian industry as a whole. Harbison’s explanation of the diﬀerent impact of the two
booms points to the fact that tobacco was produced in huge land estates while coﬀee was mainly
cultivated in small or medium ﬁelds. Since the ﬁrst boom increased the income of few landlords, it
had no substantial eﬀect on the domestic demand of basic manufactures, mostly resulting in demand
for luxuries and imports. This did not happen in the second boom because it rewarded a larger and
poorer fraction of the population, increasing the aggregate demand of basic manufactures.
We shall distinguish between two types of export booms. The ﬁrst one aﬀects the manufacturing
sector directly and takes place when there is an increase of international demand of manufactures
produced at a country level with TT. In this case, the distribution of land property rights aﬀects the
equilibrium outcome by determining the extra demand needed to make mass production proﬁtable.
Consider a traditional economy and assume that technology τ is competitive in the sense that it
allows producers to export with standard proﬁts.23 The volume of exports needed to industrialize
any market of this country is (ρ − M). So, a greater M makes smaller shocks capable of inducing
industrialization in those markets which already produce with the TT. However, the extent of the
manufacturing sector often decreases in M, reducing the number of markets which can beneﬁt from
the export boom. Which eﬀect is more important may not be simple to establish analytically as it
requires some kind of measure of expected industrialization beneﬁts.24
The second type of export boom aﬀects manufacturing markets indirectly and takes places when
there is an increase of the revenues accruing from agricultural products sold abroad. Consider an
economy exporting a certain amount of food denoted by I. Assume food is the only tradable good
of the economy and local prices are unaﬀected by international prices. The demand of food is then
23In this brief discussion it is assumed that all necessary conditions for producing tradables are met and that imports
play no signiﬁcant role. Moreover, we abstract from the extra labour force which may be needed to meet demand.
24For instance, measuring the area between the line identiﬁed by ρ and the segment representing landowner demand
(see Figure 1) does not work because it does not take into account the eﬀects of new demand generated by the proﬁts
of the industrialized markets.
20(I + ¯ ωN) and the equilibrium aggregate rents are R∗ = Ipf + ¯ ωN − L∗
f ¯ ω, where pf represents the
international price of food. For the sake of exposition, we shall focus on two extreme cases: the boom
driven only by an increase in prices and the one driven only by an increase of quantity demanded.
If pf increases with no substantial change in the volume of production then R∗ increases leaving
wage and agricultural employment unchanged. Such an increase expands the extent of landowners
demand accordingly. If land is not too concentrated – i.e. M ≥ ρ – then the increase in revenues
from exports induces a sensible growth of the industrial sector. On the contrary, if property is quite
concentrated – i.e. M < ρ – nothing happens but an expansion of traditional production. These
two stylized cases well represent Harbisons’s basic argument for the two opposite outcomes of the
colombian export booms.
If the amount of food exported I increases with no substantial eﬀects on pf, then several things
can happen. If wages are both at the subsistence level and equal to marginal productivity, production
cannot increase and the boom fails to take place. This is due to the fact that to produce more food
more workers are needed but a greater L∗
f would imply w < ¯ ω. If agricultural employment can
increase to some extent without lowering wages, say leaving them constant, then R increases as for
the case of an increase in pf. Finally, if w > ¯ ω we have that the export boom increases both R∗
and L∗
f. Again, if w is unaﬀected only R increases. On the contrary, if w decreases it may well
happen that the export boom is detrimental to industrialization. The intuition is the following.
Since w > ¯ ω, it must be that workers are demanding manufactures. With their wages reduced the
extent of their demand shrinks accordingly even if manufactures prices decrease. If workers demand of
manufactures is driven to zero and landowners does not compensate it – i.e. (M < ρ) – the industrial
sector disappears while the manufacturing sector as a whole expands dramatically. If w is not reduced
to the subsistence level but landowners demand alone is not suﬃcient to sustain mass production,
then the industrial sector shrinks to the markets facing workers demand while the manufacturing
sector as a whole expands. Finally, if landowners demand alone can sustain industrialization then
the industrial sector may or may not expand depending on technology and on the actual distribution
of proﬁts. The same is true for the manufacturing sector as a whole.
6. Discussion
In this paper we have analysed how the distribution of land ownership aﬀects income and industrial-
ization through the demand side. In order to do this we have applied a modiﬁed version of the model
of Murphy et al. [24]. The main novelty of our model is that we assume a functional distribution of
income. The motivation for this choice is two-fold: on one side, we ﬁnd that it is a better representa-
tion of an early industrializing country and, on the other, it allows us to investigate in greater detail
the impact of land property rights distribution on income and industrialization.
Consistently with the general results about income distribution found in Murphy et al. [24], we
have shown that the degree of land ownership concentration is in a non-monotonic relation with both
income and industrialization. We have also proved that, under quite general conditions, there may
be a tradeoﬀ between aggregate income and early industrialization. Indeed, their maximal values
occur for diﬀerent levels of land concentration and, in particular, we found that maximal income is
21associated with a more diﬀuse distribution of land ownership than maximal industrialization.
More important, we have shown that a high concentration of land ownership – a typical situation
in many countries on the door of industrialization – can prevent the industrial takeoﬀ. The reason
is that it induces a very unequal distribution of income with the result that only few commodities
of each kind are demanded and mass production is unproﬁtable. We have also shown that a very
diﬀuse distribution of land may be detrimental to income and industrialization. Indeed, a widespread
ownership of land allows the exploitation of scale economies in some markets of basic manufactures but
their number is likely to be quite small due to the low income of landowners. As a consequence, since
proﬁts are not shared but each entrepreneur takes all earnings of the ﬁrm she manages, a very diﬀuse
distribution of land concentrates proﬁts into the hands of very few capitalists. Therefore, a very equal
distribution of land property rights induces a very unequal distribution of income between capitalist
and everyone else with the result that the demand of manufactures produced with the industrial
technology is low and mass production is not exploited properly. In particular, our analysis shows
that the degree of land concentration determines the distribution of proﬁts because it determines the
earnings of each entrepreneur in the ﬁrst place, that is before the multiplicative process takes place.
In our opinion these ﬁndings underline the relevance of how surplus is shared among the diﬀerent
social groups.
Few remarks about the nature of these results are worth doing. In our analysis there is no
dynamics and all results come from a comparative statics exercise. Therefore, this study does not
oﬀer any reliable prediction about the impact of changes in land ownership distribution. So, although
we recognize that land redistribution is a major source of reductions in land concentration, it has not
been an explicit issue here. Indeed, a policy of land redistribution triggers a number of economic and
social mechanisms which are not captured by our model and clearly require a dynamical analysis. In
this sense, the present study can provide only weak policy suggestions. Nevertheless, the comparative
statics we have carried out tells us something important. If a country is about the industrial takeoﬀ
we expect that, ceteris paribus, countries with a very concentrated land ownership perform worse than
countries with a mild concentration. Going back to the example about South Korea and Philippines
mentioned in the introduction, we understand that South Korea’s more equal distribution of land
has helped its industrial takeoﬀ by providing a domestic demand of basic manufactures since the
very beginning of its development. In other words, we expect those countries that have successfully
carried out a land reform to be in a better position for the industrial takeoﬀ. Finally, since the
analysis abstracts from the eﬀects of industrialization in the long run, our ﬁndings must be intended
as restricted only to countries in their early phase of industrialization.
Further research should provide a detailed analysis of the role of agricultural productivity and
non-subsistence wages, taking into account the issue of unemployment. Moreover, this framework
may well ﬁt the analysis of the impact of distribution of property rights over natural resources, both
exhaustible and renewable.
22A. Appendix
1. Derivation of µ
In order to obtain the expression for µ provided in footnote 17 we must impose the condition that entrepreneurs and
landowners in equilibrium have the same income. For any M > ρ, the QR entrepreneurs who receive the demand of
landowners will demand manufactures in the interval [0,Q1] where Q1 = (M −ρ)(α−β)/α. Assuming that Q1 < QR,
entrepreneurs in [0,Q1] face additional demand and their proﬁts will be equal to [(M + QR)(α − β) − k]¯ ω. Equalizing
the latter expression to the income of each landowner R/M we obtain
[(M + QR)(α − β) − k]¯ ω =
R
M




where the solutions to equation (19) are
α(k + 1) − β ±
q




Notice that (α(k + 1) − β) is positive and greater than one by assumptions about technology, so we have one strictly
positive and one strictly negative solution. We name µ the positive one.
2. Equilibria: M ≤ µ
Deﬁne Q2 the extent of demand of the group of entrepreneurs in [0,Q1]. Then, M ≤ µ implies Q2 ≤ QR. Since
entrepreneurs in [0,Q1] face the highest demand, and hence earn the highest proﬁts, no entrepreneur demands man-
ufactures beyond QR. Moreover, in equilibrium entrepreneurs in [0,Q1] receive the demand of every entrepreneur,
including themselves, so their total demand is (QR +M). Hence, entrepreneurs in (Q1,Q2] earn additional proﬁts and
demand manufactures until Q3 = (M + Q2)(α − β)/α. By iterating this mechanism, we can calculate the equilibrium
demand and proﬁts of each market.
Points Q1,Q3,Q5,... and Q2,Q4,Q6,... can be written as follows








































































Hence, the expressions for a generic Q2i (even index) and Q2i+1 (odd index) are







































− (M − ρ) (22)







































Therefore, for any value of M ≤ µ the equilibrium demand of each market is uniquely determined and the calculation
of the equilibrium proﬁts of each entrepreneur is straightforward. In the case M = µ we get QR = Q2i for every i ≥ 1.
Figure 5 and Figure 6 give a graphical representation of industrialization for M < µ and for M = µ respectively.
3. M ≤ µ: Industrial Extent, Industrial Employment and Aggregate Income
Since no entrepreneur demands beyond market QR the extent of industrialization either zero, if M < ρ, or Q∗ = QR,
if otherwise.
Industrial employment is given by
LIT = N − Lf − LTT − E − M
In an equilibrium with positive industrialization, since i) L∗
TT = 0 and ii) E = Q∗ = QR, we have
L∗
IT = N − L∗
f − QR − M (23)
Taking into account equation (1) and the fact that F(L∗






From equations (23) and (24) we get equation (14).
Aggregate income is given by the sum of of rents, proﬁts and wages
Y = R + Π + w(Lf + Lm)
Since (Lf + Lm) = N − E − M, in equilibrium we obtain equation (15). The expression for Π∗ is derived by adding
the proﬁts of each entrepreneur, calculated on the basis of the demand she faces in equilibrium. In order to calculate
aggregate demand, we ﬁrst derive the length of the generic intervals
































¯ Q = Q∗= QR
→ ←
Figure 5. M < µ
where Q−1 ≡ 0. Multiplying the length of each interval of markets by the demand exceeding ρ that they face, we get
the aggregate demand which generates proﬁts exceeding subsistence. The demand faced by each interval of markets is
Dq∈(Q2i−1,Q2i+1] = M + Q2i
Dq∈(Q2i+2,Q2i] = M + Q2i−1
So aggregate demand is




(Q2i+1 − Q2i−1)((M − ρ) + Q2i) + (Q2i − Q2i+2)((M − ρ) + Q2i−1)

(27)
















































= (M − ρ)QRx

 1


























¯ Q = Q∗= QR = Q2
Figure 6. M = µ









 = 1 + (x + x2) + (x2 + x3 + x4) + ... =
= 1 + x + 2x2 + 2x3 + 3x4 + 3x5 + 4x6 + 4x7 + ... =
= (1 + x)(1 + 2x2 + 3x4 + 4x6 + 5x8 + ...) =
= (1 + x)
∞ X
i=0
(i + 1)x2i = (1 + x)
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ix2i = 0 + x2 + 2x4 + 3x6 + 4x8 + ... =
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 = (1 + x)
"
1







(1 − x2)2 (29)
From (29) and (28), making some rearrangements, we get








= (M − ρ)QR
α
β
Finally, taking into account entrepreneurs expenditure in food, we obtain the aggregate proﬁts Π∗ of equation (15),
that is
Π∗ = (α − β)
α
β
(M − ρ) ¯ wQR + ¯ wQR
Notice that proﬁts are equal to the units of manufactures demanded beyond those needed to introduce IT, i.e. (M −
ρ)QR, times the proﬁt earned for each unit sold, i.e. (α−β)¯ ω, times α/β which accounts for the multiplicative process
we have described.
4. Equilibria: M > µ
For M > µ we have Q2 > QR. As before, markets in [0,QR] industrialize. In order to determine whether or not other
markets introduce the IT, we must compare the demand they face with the threshold value ρ.
The sequence of Q2i+1 is formally as in 22 but stops beyond QR. The sequence of Q2i is constant and equal to










and it stops as soon as Q2i+1 stops. So far, each market in [0,QR] faces the same demand (QR + M) and each
entrepreneur in [0,QR] earns the same proﬁts. In order to take into account the multiplicative process triggered by
industrialization beyond QR, let us simplify notation and preserve the intuition about the sequence of Qs. Both Q1
and Q0 are set equal to QR, and Q2 denotes the extent of demand of the richest entrepreneurs, no matter where the
“Q1” deﬁned for the previous case falls. So, (QR,Q2] is the ﬁrst interval to receive only entrepreneurs demand, which
industrializes if and only if QR > ρ. If this happens, we call Q3 the extent of demand of entrepreneurs in (QR,Q2].
Similarly, Q4 indicate the new extent of demand of entrepreneurs in [0,Q3], and so on. Therefore, points Q1,Q3,Q5,...
and Q2,Q4,Q6,... are given by
Q1 = QR

















































27from which we get the expressions for the generic Q2i and Q2i+1


































If (32) holds with strict inequality, new demand is generated and entrepreneurs in [0,Q3] earn new proﬁts and extend






























By iteration, we get that the number of steps – that is the number of new industrialized intervals of markets – is given









Since α/(α − β) is greater than 1 there always exists a ﬁnite value of i such that inequality (33) is satisﬁed. Figure
7 shows the case of i∗ = 1 while Figure 4 in the main body refers to the case of two steps. Moreover, since QR is a
decreasing function of M, i∗ takes its maximum value for M inﬁnitesimally greater than µ and is non-increasing step
function afterwards.
5. M > µ: Industrial Extent, Industrial Employment and Aggregate Income
Given i∗ the extent of industrialization is














Similarly the extent of the manufacturing sector is













and the last group of markets which receive only the demand of the richest entrepreneurs employs the TT. However,
if the last group of entrepreneurs who industrialize faces a demand equal to ρ, then the extent of the manufacturing
sector coincides with the extent of industrialization and traditional production disappears.
The equilibrium level of L∗











Q3 ¯ Q=Q4 QR
Figure 7. Scenario 2, Sub-case II: Q∗ = Q2, ¯ Q = Q4, i∗ = 1
L∗























where ( ¯ Q − Q∗)Q2i∗+1 is the number of traditional manufactures demanded. By plugging equation (36) into (17) we
get L∗
IT.
For any i∗, aggregate proﬁts are obtained by summing the proﬁts earned by each entrepreneur. If there is no step
the net total demand is
Dπ
0 = QR(M + QR − ρ) (37)
where π is used to denote the fact that we are referring only to demand generating new proﬁts – labelled net demand,
hereafter. When there is one step net demand is
Dπ
1 = Dπ
0 + (Q2 − QR)(QR − ρ) + (QR − ρ)(Q2 − QR)x
= Dπ
0 + (Q2 − QR)[QR (1 + x) − ρ(1 + x)] (38)
where, as before x = (α−β)/α. Looking at the ﬁrst line, the second term accounts for net demand of new entrepreneurs
beyond QR: (Q2 − QR) is the number of markets while (QR − ρ) is the net demand for each of them. The third term
accounts for the additional demand received by the ﬁrst group of entrepreneurs: (QR − ρ)x = Q3 is the number of
29markets and (Q2 − QR) is their additional demand. With two steps, the new markets receiving the demand of the
richest entrepreneurs introduce the IT. Their net demand grants entrepreneurs in [0,Q5] additional proﬁts, where
Q5 < Q3. The aggregate net demand generated with two steps is
Dπ
2 = Dπ
1 + (Q2 − QR)x[(QR − ρ)x − ρ] + (Q2 − QR)x2 [(QR − ρ)x − ρ]
= Dπ




1 + x + x2 + x3
− ρ(1 + 2x + 2x2 + x3)

= Dπ




1 + x + x2 + x3
− ρ(1 + x)(1 + x + x2)

In the case of three steps we have
Dπ
3 = Dπ
2 + (Q2 − QR)x2{[(QR − ρ)x − ρ]x − ρ} + (Q2 − QR)x3{[(QR − ρ)x − ρ]x − ρ}
= Dπ




1 + x + x2 + x3 + x4 + x5
− ρ(1 + 2x + 3x2 + 3x3 + 2x4 + x5)

= Dπ









 − ρ(1 + x + x2)(1 + x + x2 + x3)


Hence, for a generic i∗ we get the following expression
Dπ















Therefore, Π∗ of equation (18) is
Π∗ = (α − β)

















 ¯ ω + ¯ ωQ∗ (40)
6. Maxima
As we proved in the main body of the article, the maximum extent of industrialization obtained for M = ρ is
b Q∗ =













Since we have two diﬀerent functions for aggregate income depending on the relation between M and µ, we must
calculate maximum income in both cases. Taking into account equations (15) and (30) for M < µ we have
Y ∗ = R + ¯ ωN + (α − β)(M − ρ)













































(k + 1)R/α¯ ω the maximum income is obtained for a concentration of land property rights such that landowners
are richer than entrepreneurs. In this case from equations (42) and (44) we get the expression b Y ∗
b Y ∗ =
α
β
R + ¯ ωN +
k + 1
β
¯ ω − 2
p
α¯ ω(k + 1)R
β











If instead µ ≤
p
(k + 1)R/α¯ ω the maximum income is reached for a M ≥ µ. In this case, the value of M which
maximizes aggregate income must be calculated numerically since the function changes depending on the number of
steps.
As we pointed out in the main body, maximum industrial employment b L∗
IT is obtained for M in [ρ,µ]. Ab absurdo
consider that there is a distribution of land ownership such that b L∗
IT is obtained for M > µ. A necessary condition for
M to maximize L∗
IT when M > µ is that (M +Q∗) does not increase in M, since i) L∗




TT = 0 for M ≤ µ and iii) L∗
TT ≥ 0 for M > µ. For M = µ industrial labour amounts to the units of labour








µ + µ) is aggregate demand of manufactures. When M > µ the richest group of entrepreneurs receives
demand by (M + Q∗
M) individuals, but other industrialized markets will receive less. However we overestimate the




M + M) + kQ∗
M (47)
We can say with certainty that (46) is greater then (47) since as M increases (M + Q∗) does not increase and Q∗
decreases. Therefore, Q∗
µ > Q∗
M for M > µ implying that it is impossible that b L∗
IT is obtained for M > µ.
In the interval [ρ,µ] there is no market operating with the TT, therefore industrial employment is given by equation










R/(α¯ ω) ≤ ρ, then maximal industrial employment is obtained for M = ρ also maximizing the extent of industri-
alization. If
p
R/(α¯ ω) ≥ µ, then b L∗
IT is obtained for M = µ which may also maximize aggregate income. Finally if
ρ <
p
R/(α¯ ω) < µ the maximum industrial employment is obtained for a level of M strictly lower than that which
maximizes aggregate income, that is
p
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